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THE SUPREME COURT'S PAlAZZOLO 
DECISION -ITS BARK IS WORSE THAN ITS 
BITE 
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE* & MICHAEL RUBIN** 
Despite the spin of the "property rights" movement, the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in the case of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island 
is good for protection of our natural resources} 
The bottom line of the decision is that the Supreme Court did 
not find a taking.2 Instead, the Court sent the case-arising from a 
state coastal protection agency's denial of a landowner's application 
to fill a salt marsh-back to the Rhode Island courts where the land-
owner's takings claim for monetary damages will almost certainly be 
rejected.!! 
On some of the underlying legal issues, the State of Rhode Island 
(and its allies who filed ten amicus briefs) won outright; in other areas, 
the ruling was consistent with Rhode Island's position.4 Where Rhode 
Island won outright, the Court was implicitly unanimous; where the 
"property rights-ers" claim victory, the vote was five to four (with the 
Justices grouped in a configuration identical to that in Bush v. Cor/». 
I. WHAT THE SUPREME COURT SAID 
The United States Supreme Court discussed four issues-and 
ruled on three of those issues-in deciding that the landowner, An-
thony Palazzolo, had not yet shown that the environmental regula-
* Attorney General, State of Rhode Island. Attorney General Whitehouse argued 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island in the United States Supreme Court. 
** Assistant Attorney General, State of Rhode Island. Mr. Rubin was trial counsel and 
assisted in preparation of the Palazzolo case throughout the course of the litigation. At the 
Boston Colle~ Environmental Affairs Law Reviw and Environmental Law Society Spring 2002 
Symposium on Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the perspective of state government was repre-
sented by Mr. Rubin and Assistant Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts Edward G. Bohlen, who was also counsel amicus curiae to the case in the United States 
Supreme Court. For purposes of this issue of the law review, this essay and the piece sub-
mitted by Assistant Attorney General Bohlen represent the state perspective on the case. 
I See~erally533U.S.606 (2001). 
2 Id. at 631-32. 
3Id. at 632. 
4 See id. 
5531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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tions, as applied to his property, constituted a taking. The four issues 
were: 
(1) Ripeness6-a procedural issue concerning whether a claim is 
ready to be adjudicated; 
(2) Value7-the extent of the loss necessary to automatically win 
a takings claim; 
(3) Parcels-whether to consider a landowner's entire contiguous 
holdings in assessing the impact of government actions; and 
(4) Sequence9-whether a person who acquires land subsequent 
to the promulgation of a regulation can claim a taking at all. 
First, the V.S. Supreme Court reversed the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court's holding that the landowner's takings claim was not 
ripe under federal ripeness principles;lO second, the V.S. Supreme 
Court affirmed the Rhode Island courts' holding that the landowner 
failed to establish a deprivation of all economic value of his prop-
erty;ll third, the Court refrained from ruling on the parcel issue, not-
ing it was not properly presented12; and fourth, the Court reversed the 
state court's invocation of a per se rule that a pre-acquisition regula-
tion automatically bars a takings claim.13 
II. ANALYSIS 
How do these rulings fare from an environmental perspective? 
Ripeness. The outcome on the ripeness issue was fact-specific and 
the Court made no adverse change to existing law.14 The conclusion 
that Palazzolo's claim was ripe was unavoidable under the facts as the 
Court viewed them: the State would allow no development in the wet-
lands and would permit one house to be built on the upland por-
6 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 618-26. 
7Id. at 630-31. 
8Id. at 631-32. 
9 Id. at 626-30. 
10 Id. at 619. 
11 Id. at 630. 
12 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631. 
15 Id. at 627. 
14 Compare id. at 624-26, with City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 
526 U.S. 687, 698 (1999), Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 738 
(1997), MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 342, 351, 353 n.9 
(1986), and Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 
473 U.S. 172, 182, 186 (1985). 
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tion.15 Read thus, there was no administrative step left for Palazzolo to 
take.16 This is completely in line with the prevailing ripeness require-
ments. 
Indeed, the Court reaffirmed that, where ambiguities do exist, 
the ripeness defense is as applicable as ever: "A landowner may not 
establish a taking before a land-use authority has the opportunity, us-
ing its own reasonable procedures, to decide and explain the reach of 
a challenged regulation."17 Thus, the ripeness defense lives on in 
situations where there is ambiguity as to the nature and extent of ei-
ther the regulations or the land.1s Vague or incomplete applications 
submitted by developers will still not support takings claims. Nor will 
it be sufficient for a developer to make a cursory run at the agency 
process before turning to court. Existing law remains intact. 
There was even one favorable advance beyond the status quo in 
this area. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, extended an explicit 
invitation to state legislatures and courts to fashion their own inde-
pendent, reasonable, state law ripeness rules which the U.S. Supreme 
Court would be bound to respect.19 Thus, states can reinforce the 
mandate that a developer must make a meaningful and informative 
application (and, where necessary, multiple applications). This invita-
tion merits the attention of environmental organizations. 
As national precedent, the Palazzolo decision dealing with federal 
ripeness principles is a very small net plus for the environment. 
Value. This was the primary point of attack by Palazzolo's counsel, 
the Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF). PLF had complained that the 
regulation left Palazzolo with mere "crumbs" or "smidgeons" of 
value.20 PLF argued for the expansion of the categorical takings rule 
espoused in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Counci~ which concerned 
regulations that deprived a landowner of "all economically beneficial 
uses "21 of his property, in an effort to allow takings claims to arise 
whenever there are substantial reductions in property value due to 
regulation.22 On this, their main contention, PLF lost totally and 
15 See Palnzzow, 533 U.S. at 624-26. 
16 [d. at 624-25. 
17 [d. at 620. 
18 See id. at 620-21. 
19 [d. at 625-26. 
20 Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, 2000 WL 1742033, at *9, *38, Palazzolo v. Rhode Is-
land, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (No. 99-2047) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief on the Merits]. 
21 505 U.S. 1003,1019 (1992). 
22 See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, supra note 20, at *36-48. 
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unanimously.23 The Court's opinion should be interpreted as 
reaffirming the public's authority to impose significant restrictions on 
the use of privately-owned land. 
Count this as a solid plus for the environment. 
Whole Parcel. The Court's refusal of Palazzolo's invitation to revisit 
the ''whole parcel" rule leaves in place favorable precedent.24 Previ-
ously, in Concrete Pipe & Produds of California, Inc. v. Construdion Labor-
ers Pension Trust, the Court reiterated the "whole parcel" rule set forth 
in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New Yom stating: "[T]he 
relevant question . . . is whether the property taken is all, or only a 
portion of the parcel in question."25 The ''whole parcel" principle re-
mains intact to thwart attempts by developers to manipulate their 
holdings so as to contrive the appearance of an actionable taking. 
This affirmation of the status quo leaves intact good law for envi-
ronmentalists. 
Sequence. The Supreme Court rejected the convenient bright-line 
rule adopted by the Rhode Island Supreme Court and a number of 
other courts that only regulations imposed after a plaintiff's invest-
ment in property can constitute a taking of that property.26 
To quote Professor John Echeverria of Georgetown University 
Law School: 
On the positive side, however, the Court's decision does 
not preclude consideration of pre-acquisition notice as a fac-
tor in takings analysis. Indeed, in light of Justice O'Connor's 
crucial concurring opinion, the case is best read as endors-
ing consideration of pre-acquisition notice as a relevant factor 
in takings cases. This likely means that most long-established 
environmental and land use regulations will be largely im-
mune from takings challenges. And they should become in-
creasingly immune from challenge as properties change 
hands and additional time passes. 
23 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630. 
24 See id. at 631. 
25 508 U.S. 602, 644 (1993) (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 
U.S. 104,130-31 (1978)). 
26 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627. Contra, e.g., Golf Club of Plantation, Inc. v. City of Planta-
tion, 717 So. 2d 166, 170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Nat'l Adver. Co. v. Vill. of Downers 
Grove, 561 N.E.2d 1300, 1309 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Adams Outdoor Adver. v. City of East 
Lansing, 614 N.W.2d 634, 645 (Mich. 2000), reh'g denied, 618 N.W.2d 589 (Mich. 2000) 
(table decision), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 920 (2001); Claridge v. N.H. Wetlands Bd., 485 A.2d 
287,291 (N.H. 1984). 
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... Justice O'Connor insisted that pre-acquisition notice 
must be a relevant factor in takings analysis in order to avoid 
potential "windfalls." It seems very likely following Palazzolo, 
at least as a matter of practice if not strict legal rule, investors 
who have purchased restricted lands at a deep discount, or 
who have engaged in other strategic behavior in an attempt 
to manufacture a taking claim in light of pre-existing regula-
tory restrictions, will continue to be barred from recovering 
under the Takings Clause.27 
159 
The conclusion reached by the Supreme Court is the correct 
one, and Attorney General Whitehouse, in arguing the case, con-
ceded as much.28 The Attorney General felt that the Penn Central 
standard that the Court adopted could avoid harsh and unjust results 
in unusual circumstances, while still keeping developers that would 
abuse the system at bay. We believe, provided it is approached with 
sensitivity and understanding by bench and bar alike, that this is the 
fair and proper outcome. 
Count this as a wash for the environment. The "bright line" rule 
was unsustainable in light of its potential for unfair results. 
CONCLUSION 
In the final analysis, the Court's reluctance to adopt per se rules 
means that the Palazzolo decision will do little to change the actual 
outcomes of specific lawsuits. It will force judges and lawyers alike to 
do the hard work of sifting through the particularized facts of each 
case. Although Palazzolo initially caused a ripple of anxiety throughout 
the environmental community (largely because of immediate and 
high-speed "spin" from property rights activists), balanced land use 
planning and control should actually gain legal ground against tak-
ings challenges. Our task now, as environmental advocates, is to ex-
plain this, not only to courts, but to regulators and, most importantly, 
to the people of this environmentally blessed country. 
27 John D. Echeverria, A Preliminary Assessment of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 31 ENVTL. 
L. REp. 11,112, 11,113-14 (2001) (first emphasis added). 
28 See Transcript of Oral Argument, 2001 WI.. 196990, at *43-44, Palazzolo v. Rhode Is-
land (Feb. 26, 2001) (No. 99-2047). 
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BACKGROUND: THE PALAZZOLO FACTS 
Anthony Palazzolo was president of Shore Gardens, Inc. (SGI) 
when (or very shortly after) it acquired a parcel of land in 1959 in the 
Misquamicut section of the town of Westerly, Rhode Island for 
roughly $8,000.29 Palazzolo became the sole shareholder of SGI in 
1960.30 The parcel is located on the inland side (the inter-coastal or 
bay side-not the ocean side) of a barrier beach, between the crest of 
the beach strip (a road called Atlantic Avenue runs along this crest) 
and the shore of a 460-acre saltwater coastal estuary called Winnapaug 
Pond.31 Between 1959 and 1961, SGI sold off eleven individual subdi-
vided house-lots to various purchasers.32 Most of these subdivided lots 
were carved out of the upland, non-marsh area of the larger parcel 
and could be, and in fact were, built upon with little alteration to the 
land.33 
Mter this series of transactions, SGI retained the status of record 
owner of the twenty-acre remnant, eighteen acres of which was occu-
pied by marshland.34 Most of this land is subject to daily tidal inunda-
tion in addition to "ponding" in small pools that occurs throughout 
this wetland acreage.35 "This area serves as a refuge and feeding 
ground for fish, shellfish, and birds, provides a buffer for flooding, 
and absorbs and filters run-off into the pond. "36 
From 1965 through 1977, state regulations governing alterations 
to coastal wetlands grew stricter, evolving into a virtual absolute pro-
hibition as of 1977.37 In 1971, Rhode Island created the Coastal Re-
sources Management Council (CRMC) and it was given responsibility 
for administering this prohibition and related regulations.38 
29 Palazzolo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, CA. No. 88-0297, 1997 WI... 1526546, at *1 
(R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 1997), a/I'd on other grounds sub nom. Palazzolo v. State ex reL Ta-
vares, 746 A.2d 707 (R.1. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded sub nom. Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
30 Tavares, 746 A.2d at 710. 
31 [d. at 709. 
32 [d. at 710. 
33 See id. 
34 [d. 
35 [d. 
36 Tavares, 746 A.2d at 710. 
37 See id. at 710-11. 
38 [d. 
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SCI's corporate charter was revoked by the Rhode Island Secre-
tary of State in 1978, and Palazzolo, the sole shareholder, became the 
automatic successor to whatever property SCI previously owned.39 
In March 1983, Palazzolo filed an application with the CRMC, 
seeking approval to fill the full eighteen acres of salt marsh.40 No par-
ticular purpose was specified.41 That application was rejected by the 
CRMC.42 In January 1985, Palazzolo filed another application to fill 
the wetlands on the property so he could create a recreational beach 
facility.43 This application was likewise denied by the CRMC.44 
This lawsuit eventually followed. 45 Palazzolo sought damages in 
the amount of $3,150,000 (plus interest), based on the value he 
claimed the land would have after filling the wetlands and developing 
the property as seventy-four lots for single-family homes.46 Each new 
home would presumably be served by its own septic system. Mter a 
Rhode Island trial judge found that the denial of Palazzolo's applica-
tion was not a taking for which compensation was owed, and, that the 
filling would have been a public nuisance, Palazzolo appealed to the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court and then the United States Supreme 
Court.47 
~9 ld. at 710. 
40 ld. at 711. 
41 See id. 
42 Tavares, 746 A.2d at 711. 
4~ ld. 
44 ld. 
45 See id. 
46 ld. 
47 See Palazzolo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, CA No. 88-0297, 1997 WL 1526546, at 
*5-6 (R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 1997), afl'd on other grounds sub nom. Palazzolo v. State ex reL 
Tavares, 746 A.2d 707 (RI. 2000), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded sub nom. Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 

